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Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s 1982 plurality decision in Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.1 remains one of the most controversial bankruptcy 
decisions in the Court’s history.2 Northern Pipeline limited Article I bankruptcy 
courts’3 authority to hear and decide disputes that fall within the “core”4 of the 
bankruptcy power, but declined to provide much guidance concerning the parame-
ters of these bankruptcy-specific “public rights.”5 Scholars and practitioners who 
expected the Court to abandon Northern Pipeline,6 however, were in for a rude 
awakening when the Court issued its decision in Stern v. Marshall7 in 2011. Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts not only reaffirmed the constitutional limits 
of the Article I bankruptcy courts as outlined in Northern Pipeline, but also indicat-
ed that litigant consent is insufficient to overcome these limits.8 
© 2016 S. Todd Brown 
 * Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School. 
 1. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 311, 311–12 (1991) (emphasizing the Northern Pipeline decision was “fatally flawed” and arguing 
that Congress – and not the Supreme Court – should decide the status and jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 991 
(1988) (arguing Northern Pipeline “was not only badly reasoned but wrongly decided”). 
 3. See infra notes 30–31, 59–61 and accompanying text; Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that while Congress exercised “its Article I power” when it created bankruptcy 
courts, this did not “endanger the independence of the Judicial Branch,” i.e. Article III courts). This essay uses 
the terms “non-Article III court” and “Article I court” interchangeably to describe the status of bankruptcy 
courts. 
 4. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 6. Brook Gotberg, Preferences Are Public Rights, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1355, 1379 (2013) (“[P]rior to Stern, 
the trend in thinking appeared to be that Northern Pipeline was outdated and likely to be limited to its facts, if 
not actually overturned.”). 
 7. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 8. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
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Although the Stern majority characterized its decision as “a ‘narrow’ one,”9 lower 
courts have since struggled to define the parameters of the bankruptcy courts’ au-
thority.10 Which issues do bankruptcy courts have the power to hear and decide 
consistent with Article III? May the parties to a proceeding consent to adjudication 
of other matters before a bankruptcy court? If so, must this consent be express, or 
may it be merely implied? 
In 2015, Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif11 placed these questions 
squarely before the Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor noted the 
public and private rights question before deciding the matter solely on the consent 
question.12 Specifically, the majority concluded that bankruptcy courts may hear 
and decide questions of private right with the knowing and voluntary consent of the 
parties.13 While noting that “it is good practice for courts to seek express statements 
of consent or nonconsent,”14 the majority determined that the Constitution requires 
only implied consent.15 Thus, the opinion should have allayed some of the concerns 
about the constitutionality of the modern bankruptcy court structure going for-
ward. 
Yet the Court’s views concerning the parameters of “public rights” in bankrupt-
cy are only marginally clearer now than they were before Stern.16 Justice Thomas 
and Justice Scalia have questioned whether the public rights doctrine is the proper 
framework for evaluating the work that bankruptcy courts may or may not per-
form.17 In contrast to the broad reasoning of his opinion for the majority in Stern, 
Chief Justice Roberts’ Wellness dissent explained in narrow terms why the case in-
volved a question that bankruptcy courts could decide.18 The other justices appear 
content to accept the public and private rights dichotomy in spite of the Court’s 
 9. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 10. See Frank Volk, First Impressions: Interpreting Stern, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22 (Dec. 2011/Jan. 2012) 
(noting lower courts’ difficulties to discern the implications of Stern and observing the “burden of uncertainty, 
commingled with busy dockets and the perceived loss of predictability, has caused considerable, and under-
standable, consternation at times”). 
 11. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 12. Id. at 1942 n.7. 
 13. Id. at 1948. 
 14. Id. at 1948 n.13. 
 15. Id. at 1947–48. 
 16. This essay uses the term “public rights” as employed in Northern Pipeline sparingly and only where it is 
necessary to capture the rationale of the cases that rely upon the public rights doctrine. The Supreme Court has 
not grounded its recent decisions in this doctrine. 
 17. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1967 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Bank-
ruptcy courts clearly do not qualify as territorial courts or courts-martial, but they are not an easy fit in the 
‘public rights’ category, either.”); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting 
that bankruptcy does not fall within any of the exceptions to Article III, including public rights); Granfinanci-
era, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 66 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The notion that the power to adjudicate a 
legal controversy between two private parties may be assigned to a non-Article III, yet federal, tribunal is entire-
ly inconsistent with the origins of the public rights doctrine.”). 
 18. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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consistent refusal to articulate a clear framework for distinguishing the two in bank-
ruptcy. 
The limited guidance on what is and is not within bankruptcy courts’ authority 
is problematic for several reasons. Historically, much of the administration of bank-
ruptcy cases has been left to non-Article III decision makers and today there is little 
institutional support for transforming bankruptcy courts into Article III courts.19 
Additionally, a system that hinges upon litigant consent may afford aggressive liti-
gants with opportunities to leverage the threat of additional transaction costs and 
delays associated with Article III court proceedings (or, at least, requiring de novo 
review of bankruptcy court recommendations). At a minimum, greater clarity con-
cerning the parameters of the bankruptcy courts’ authority to adjudicate without 
the parties’ consent should reduce this potential gamesmanship and enhance effi-
ciency. 
This essay recounts the Court’s decisions in this area and demonstrates that they 
collectively suggest an effort to return bankruptcy administration to something that 
resembles its traditional design.20 While the Court has been reluctant to restrict the 
bankruptcy courts’ more administrative functions, it has limited their role in pri-
vate rights disputes to a de facto adjunct status in the absence of consent.21 Moreo-
ver, this essay suggests that the collective lesson of Stern and Wellness is that Con-
gress may not manufacture consent to adjudication in bankruptcy court through 
undue coercion.22 As explained, this current hybrid system of administrative review 
and consent may check the necessary constitutional boxes, but it provides little as-
surance that the objectives of Article III will be realized; further, it generates delays 
and costs that significantly undermine the administrative efficiencies of utilizing 
non-Article III bankruptcy courts.23 
I. Background 
On the surface, Congress’ power to establish bankruptcy courts lacking the protec-
tions of Article III is limited: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, 
 19. See Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy 47 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for 
Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 711, 2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/721/ 
(“There are no signs that Congress is inclined to do so, or that the judiciary will be pushing for such a resolu-
tion.”). 
 20. See discussion infra Parts I, II. 
 21. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 22. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II. 
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receive for their Services, a Compensation which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office.24 
Yet the Court has repeatedly rejected a “conclusory reference to the language of 
Article III”25 when considering the various non-Article III bodies that appear to ex-
ercise judicial power.26 Instead, the Court has alternated between a formalist ap-
proach in some cases and a functionalist approach in others.27 This has lead to a 
body of law with “frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.”28 
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (the “Code”) tested the limits of Article III. The 
law provided bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction over substantially all “civil pro-
ceedings arising under . . . or arising in or related to cases under the Code.”29 With 
respect to these matters, the bankruptcy judges held largely the same powers as oth-
er Article III court judges, including the power to “issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the Code.30 
Notwithstanding the breadth and depth of their judicial roles, bankruptcy court 
judges were limited to 14-year terms, could be removed by the judicial conference 
for the applicable circuit prior to the expiration of their terms, and were not entitled 
to the salary protections of Article III.31 
Although framing the new bankruptcy courts in this way promised to enhance 
administrative efficiency and resolve significant political resistance to earlier pro-
posals,32 the constitutionality of this streamlined structure under Article III was, at 
best, uncertain.33 A mere four years after the adoption of the Code, a divided Su-
 24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 25. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986). 
 26. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 
756–57 (2010). 
 27. Id. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation 
of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21–22 (1998) (contrasting formalism versus functionalism). 
 28. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)). 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1976) (repealed 1984). 
 30. See S. Todd Brown, Constitutional Gaps in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 194 n.92 
(2012) (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006)) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the rais-
ing of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action 
or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to pre-
vent an abuse of process.”). 
 31. See id. at 194. 
 32. The political and administrative considerations that led to the original bankruptcy court structure have 
been examined extensively over the years. See, e.g., id. at 192–94 (outlining the effort to enhance administrative 
efficiency by expanding the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction and the resistance to elevating these courts to Article 
III status); Hon. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1978 – Part Two: The Third Branch Reacts, 81 AM. BANKR. L. J. 165, 170–71 (2007) (discussing the hostility of 
Article III judges in affording bankruptcy judges Article III status, i.e., as “judges” rather than “referees”). 
 33. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy 
Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297 (1981) (reviewing the various arguments in support of the Article I 
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preme Court declared the system unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline.34 Congress 
reshaped the bankruptcy courts two years later,35 and this revised system escaped 
review by the Court for more than a quarter century.36 During this time, bankruptcy 
courts exercised jurisdiction over a broad range of questions that fell within their 
statutory “core” jurisdiction.37 After the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern, however, it 
was unclear whether and to what extent bankruptcy courts had the constitutional 
power to hear and decide at least some of these “core” matters.38 The Court’s subse-
quent decisions provided some clarity concerning the administration of bankruptcy 
cases after Stern, but others remain unanswered.39 
This section highlights the Court’s rationale in Northern Pipeline, the legislative 
effort to respond to the decision, and the Court’s attempts to reconcile the modern 
bankruptcy system with Article III in recent years.40 
 
bankruptcy courts and arguing that they fail to overcome the framers’ goal of ensuring judicial independence). 
As Professor Krattenmaker noted, precedent in this area was “so vague and inconsistent as to prove meaningless 
at best.” Id. at 298–99. See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitution-
ality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 560, 561 (1980) (concluding that 
the 1979 Magistrate Act violated Article III). 
 34. 458 U.S. 50, 50–52, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 35. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. 
 36. Between 1984 and 2011, the Court heard issues relating to the 1984 Amendments, but not substantively 
on “core” versus “non-core” proceedings until Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). See, e.g., Union Bank v. 
Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 156–57 (1991) (examining the legislative history of the 1984 Amendments and holding 
that payments on long-term debt, as well as payments on short-term debt, could qualify for the ordinary course 
of business exception to trustee’s power to avoid preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code); Granfinan-
ciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–52 (1989) (holding that petitioner corporations were entitled to their 
constitutional Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury because fraudulent conveyance actions, although 
designated as core proceedings that could be adjudicated by bankruptcy judges, were matters of private rather 
than public rights). 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988) defined fifteen “core” subject matters over which bankruptcy courts have 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the district 
court could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over non-core proceeding where dispute was sufficiently related 
to pending bankruptcy and where the dispute could have a conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate); Arnold 
Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 168–69 (1st Cir. 1987) (indicating 
that “core proceedings” was meant to be interpreted broadly, close to, or congruent with constitutional limits); 
Volpert v. Ellis (In re Volpert), 177 B.R. 81, 87–89 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (examining the legislative history of 
the Bankruptcy Amendments and holding that if the proceeding is of a type that is within a bankruptcy court’s 
core jurisdiction, a bankruptcy judge has authority to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
 38. See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942 (2015) (holding that litigants may 
validly consent to adjudication by bankruptcy courts); White v. Kubotek Corp., 487 B.R. 1, 7–9 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(determining that notwithstanding the ruling in Stern, the Bankruptcy Court clearly had subject matter jurisdic-
tion to interpret its prior order). 
 39. See, e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2168 (2014) (holding that when a bank-
ruptcy court is presented with a Stern claim, the proper course is for the bankruptcy court to issue proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court). However, the Court declined to 
decide whether the petitioner was entitled to review of its fraudulent conveyance claims by an Article III court, 
regardless of parties’ consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court. Id. at 2715. 
 40. See infra Parts I.A, I.B. 
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A. Northern Pipeline and the 1984 Amendments 
In Northern Pipeline, the debtor pursued a breach of contract action against Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co. (Marathon) in bankruptcy court.41 Marathon sought to dismiss 
the case, arguing that bankruptcy judges lacked constitutional authority to preside 
over the dispute.42 The bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss, and the dis-
trict court reversed.43 Upon granting certiorari, a majority of the Court agreed that 
the Article I bankruptcy courts lacked constitutional authority to hear and decide 
the matter.44 
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion (joined by Justice Marshall, Justice 
Blackmun, and Justice Stevens) stressed the structural importance of an “independ-
ent Judiciary” in the federal system.45 Given that the Constitution “commands that 
the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded” through “clear institutional 
protections,” Justice Brennan reasoned that bankruptcy judges must enjoy these 
protections to exercise the sweeping jurisdiction contemplated under the new law.46 
The plurality acknowledged that the Court had previously recognized congres-
sional authority to establish legislative courts: territorial courts, courts-martial, and 
those that preside over matters involving “public rights.”47 The first two types of leg-
islative courts were not instructive, and the plurality readily distinguished the third. 
Specifically, the plurality explained that “public rights” involve “matters arising 
‘between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with 
the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative de-
partments,’ and only to matters that historically could have been determined exclu-
sively by those departments.”48 When Congress creates a statutory right, it “clearly 
has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens 
of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindi-
cate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the 
specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.”49 The power to delegate this role 
to an Article I decision maker is merely “incidental” to the right itself; it is part and 
parcel of the exercise of the legislative power to create the right.50 
 41. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56 (1982). 
 42. Id. at 56–57. 
 43. Id. at 57. 
 44. Id. at 87 (plurality opinion). Id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Six justices – Justice Brennan, 
joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens, and Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice 
O’Connor – indicated that a bankruptcy court did not have authority to adjudicate the lawsuit. 
 45. Id. at 59–60. 
 46. Id. 
 47. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 66–70 (1982). 
 48. Id. at 67–68 (internal citations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 83. 
 50. Id. at 83–84. 
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The plurality then distinguished these public rights from private rights, defined 
as “the liability of one individual to another under the law,”51 such as the contract 
dispute between the debtor and Marathon. When the right exists independent of 
the legislative enactment, requiring adjudication of a private right before an Article 
I tribunal is not a mere extension of the legislative authority to create rights. Adju-
dication of these private rights lies “at the core of the historically recognized judicial 
power,”52 and “such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial 
power of the United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art[icle] III 
courts.”53 
Subsequent to the Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline, the bankruptcy system 
operated in accordance with the “Interim Emergency Rule.”54 This rule operated 
under the legal fiction that bankruptcy matters were pending before the federal dis-
trict courts (which, as Article III courts, were authorized to exercise the powers con-
templated under the Code), who automatically referred all bankruptcy cases to the 
bankruptcy courts for administration.55 With respect to related proceedings (com-
monly referred to as “core” matters), bankruptcy judges entered final orders as they 
had before.56 The bankruptcy courts effectively performed all of the work in “nonre-
lated proceedings” (commonly referred to as “non-core”) too, but could only issue 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; “the district court actually signed 
the orders.”57 Many at the time understood the need for the rule, though they also 
viewed it as “unworkable and of doubtful constitutionality.”58 
When Congress finally restructured the bankruptcy courts, it largely tracked the 
Interim Emergency Rule.59 Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984,60 the judicial council for each circuit was authorized to appoint 
bankruptcy judges (to 14-year terms) as adjuncts to the federal district courts; these 
bankruptcy judges were authorized to hear any or all bankruptcy cases and pro-
ceedings referred to them by Article III courts.61 Bankruptcy judges were authorized 
to adjudicate “core” proceedings, and they could also hear and decide “non-core” 
 51. Id. at 71–72. 
 52. Id. at 70. 
 53. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982). 
 54. See Vern Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1–2 n.1 (1983); 1 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3-6 to 3-7, 3-110 to 3-113 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2015). 
 55. Countryman, supra note 54, at 1–2, n.1. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 1 THOMAS J. SALERNO & JORDAN A. KROOP, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION AND PRACTICE: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE § 3.05[C], at 3-10 (4th ed. Supp. 2012). 
 58. Stuart Taylor Jr., Fate of Bankruptcy System in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1982, at D1. See also Coun-
tryman, supra note 54, at 3. 
 59. Brown, supra note 30, at 197. 
 60. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (1984). 
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proceedings with the consent of the parties.62 If any party did not consent to adjudi-
cation of non-core matters before the bankruptcy judge, the judge could nonethe-
less make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law subject to de novo review 
by the district court.63 
Although this legislative solution did not fully address the constitutional con-
cerns raised in Northern Pipeline, it effectively precluded reconsideration of the re-
vised bankruptcy court system for nearly three decades. Bankruptcy courts exer-
cised broad authority over the cases and proceedings before them, and district 
courts effectively withdrew the reference or reviewed matters de novo when chal-
lenges to the bankruptcy courts’ authority under Northern Pipeline arose.64 In the 
absence of such challenges, bankruptcy courts and practitioners largely came to ac-
cept the constitutional validity of the delegation of authority under this structure. 
As one judge noted, “in exercising my delegated authority, I have entered countless 
orders as final without a second thought about the legitimacy of what I was do-
ing.”65 
B. Stern v. Marshall 
The first significant challenge to this structure, Stern v. Marshall,66 “involved an ex-
pansive but widely embraced view of consent, a procedural history that effectively 
precluded de novo review, and a series of appeals driven by both the high stakes of 
the litigation and a degree of personal animus that was severe enough to survive the 
passing of the original litigants.”67 
The debtor, Vickie Lynn Marshall (better known as Anna Nicole Smith) (herein-
after “Vickie”), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy ostensibly as a result of a default 
judgment against her in a matter involving her former housekeeper,68 but much of 
the case centered on her ongoing litigation concerning the estate of her late hus-
 62. Id. § 157. 
 63. Id. § 157(c)(1). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1993) (directing the district court to with-
draw reference of an adversary proceeding from the bankruptcy court and conduct a jury trial); In re Ben 
Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394, 1396 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Cooper’s adversary proceeding was “core” within 
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988) and reversing the district court, which had withdrawn the refer-
ence from the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction); In re Transcon Lines, 121 B.R. 837, 841 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (dis-
cussing how § 157(c)(1) of the 1984 Bankruptcy Act requires de novo review by the district court of “non-core” 
matters and that withdrawal of a case to district court is appropriate if parties do not consent to bankruptcy 
jurisdiction). 
 65. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 321 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2011). 
 66. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 67. Brown, supra note 30, at 203. 
 68. The suit between Vickie and the housekeeper was settled soon after the bankruptcy filing. Charles Lane, 
Anna Nicole Smith’s Supreme Fight, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2006, at A01. 
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band, J. Howard Marshall II.69 In May 1996, E. Pierce Marshall, J. Howard’s son, 
initiated an adversary proceeding in Vickie’s Chapter 11 case seeking a determina-
tion that certain of her contingent liabilities in this litigation were not dischargeable 
pursuant to Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.70 Two months later, Pierce filed 
a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case and attached a copy of the complaint from 
the adversary proceeding.71 Vickie objected to the proof of claim and asserted sever-
al counterclaims.72 
Although Pierce argued that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the 
litigation concerning J. Howard’s estate,73 the court concluded that Pierce consented 
to its adjudication of the matter by filing a proof of claim.74 The bankruptcy court 
granted Vickie summary judgment with respect to Pierce’s claim on November 5, 
1999.75 Nearly a year later, the bankruptcy court awarded her nearly $450 million in 
damages on her counterclaim.76 
On appeal, Pierce challenged the judgment on several grounds, one of which be-
ing that the counterclaim was a non-core matter requiring Article III adjudication 
under Northern Pipeline.77 The district court agreed and conducted an extensive, in-
dependent review.78 Before the court could enter judgment, however, the state pro-
bate court entered a final order in the matter in Pierce’s favor. Pierce then moved 
for summary judgment in the district court, asserting that the court was bound to 
the probate court’s findings under various theories of claim and issue preclusion.79 
The district court rejected the motion and entered judgment in favor of Vickie for 
nearly $90 million.80 
 69. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 70. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, 616 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (including counterclaims for fraudulent transfer, tortious interferences with inheritance, breach of 
fiduciary duty, abuse of process, fraud, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract). 
 73. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 257 B.R. 35, 36 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000) (“E. Pierce Marshall con-
tinues to complain that this court lacks jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding because this claim belongs in 
the probate case now in trial in Texas. Notably, however, he has never brought a motion on this subject on 
proper notice pursuant to this court’s motion rules. For this reason alone this issue has never been properly 
brought before this court, and E. Pierce Marshall is entitled to no relief on this subject.”). 
 74. Id. at 37 (“E. Pierce Marshall filed his claim against the bankruptcy estate in this case. He thus volun-
tarily submitted himself to the bankruptcy court’s equity jurisdiction as to all claims by the estate against him, 
including the claims asserted in this adversary proceeding.”). 
 75. In re Marshall, 264 B.R. at 616. 
 76. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, 617 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 77. Id. at 614. 
 78. Id. at 618–32. 
 79. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 271 B.R. 858, 862 (2001) (C.D. Cal 2001). 
 80. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 58 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding Vickie was entitled 
to $44,292,767.33 in compensatory damages, plus punitive damages in the same amount). 
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Initially, the Ninth Circuit resolved the dispute on other grounds.81 When it fi-
nally addressed the Northern Pipeline question, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
bankruptcy court “exceeded its statutory grant of power and the constitutional 
limitations on that power when it purported to enter a final judgment” and, accord-
ingly, that “the findings of the Texas probate court should be afforded preclusive 
effect because it is the earliest final judgment on matters relevant to this proceed-
ing.”82 Although 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) provided that core proceedings include 
counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate, the panel 
refused to read this language as “permit[ting] the bankruptcy court to consider un-
der § 157(b)(2)(C) counterclaims that are factually and legally unrelated to the 
claim being asserted against the bankruptcy estate” because such a reading “would 
certainly run afoul of the Court’s holding in Marathon.”83 Given that the counter-
claim at issue involved such factually and legally unrelated matters – a point driven 
home by the fact that the bankruptcy court addressed them separately several 
months after the original claim was resolved – the appellate panel reversed.84 
When Stern reached the Supreme Court, the majority agreed with the debtor’s 
contention that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) authorized bank-
ruptcy courts to enter final orders on all counterclaims.85 The majority further con-
cluded that: (i) this grant of authority was unconstitutional;86 and (ii) Pierce did not 
consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the counterclaim by filing a proof of 
claim.87 
First, the majority rejected the idea that a counterclaim might qualify as a “pub-
lic right” because it was “not a matter that could be pursued only by grace of the 
other branches . . . or one that ‘historically could have been determined exclusively 
by’ those branches.”88 It did not “flow from a federal statutory scheme,” and its 
resolution was not “‘completely dependent upon’ adjudication of a claim created by 
federal law.”89 Rather, the counterclaim was merely a claim under state common law 
between two private parties.90 Thus, although the Court had recognized that limited 
referral of matters in a “particularized area of law” to a specialized administrative 
body may be consistent with Article III, this dispute involved a court “with substan-
 81. However, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the appellate decision. Marshall v. Marshall 
(In re Marshall), 547 U.S. 293,  299–300, 315 (2006). 
 82. Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall) 600 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 83. Id. at 1057. 
 84. Id. at 1057, 1065. 
 85. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2605, 2608 (2011). 
 86. Id. at 2608 (“Although we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter final 
judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does not.”). 
 87. Id. at 2614–15, n.8. 
 88. Id. at 2614 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982)). 
 89. Id. at 2614. 
 90. Id. 
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tive jurisdiction reaching any area of the corpus juris.”91 Further, if “such an exercise 
of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by 
deeming it part of some amorphous ‘public right,’ then Article III would be trans-
formed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of powers we have 
long recognized into mere wishful thinking.”92 
Second, the majority expressed concern that creditors “have no choice but to file 
their claims in bankruptcy proceedings if they want to pursue the claims at all,” so 
“the notion of ‘consent’ does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in 
other contexts.”93 Congress has the power to require creditors to file a proof of 
claim to have their private right to payment against a debtor considered; in so do-
ing, creditors consent to the steps necessary to have that claim evaluated and paid 
according to the Code.94 In some circumstances, a court must consider all legal and 
factual questions relevant to the disposition of other claims between the debtor and 
the creditor.95 In Stern, however, resolution of Pierce’s claim “in no way” affected 
the disposition of the estate’s counterclaim.96 Rather, the counterclaim was an inde-
pendent right of action aimed at augmenting the estate, which, under Northern 
Pipeline, must be decided by an Article III court.97 
In sum, instead of eliminating the divisions of authority required by Northern 
Pipeline, the Court’s decision in Stern: (i) reaffirmed that bankruptcy courts may 
decide certain matters but may not exercise the “judicial Power of the United 
States;”98 (ii) established that bankruptcy courts thus lacked the power to enter or-
ders in at least some matters designated as “core” under the statute;99 (iii) rejected 
the broad conception of consent adopted by the bankruptcy court;100 and (iv) ques-
tioned whether litigant consent was a sufficient basis to authorize bankruptcy court 
adjudication over non-core claims in light of the institutional interests protected by 
Article III.101 
C. Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison 
 91. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2615, n.8. 
 94. Id. at 2629 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 2617. In Stern, there was overlap between Vickie’s counterclaim and Pierce’s defamation claim 
that led the lower courts to conclude the counterclaim was compulsory. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2616. 
 97. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011). 
 98. Id. at 2611. 
 99. Id. at 2620; Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2014). 
 100. Stern at 2615, n.8. 
 101. Id. at 2616. 
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Notwithstanding the majority’s admonition that its decision was “a ‘narrow’ one,”102 
Stern quickly became “the mantra of every litigant who, for strategic or tactical rea-
sons, would rather litigate somewhere other than the bankruptcy court.”103 Some 
litigants – including many who initially brought the proceedings in bankruptcy 
court – argued that their constitutional rights to an Article III forum had been vio-
lated in matters that had already been decided by bankruptcy judges without any 
challenge to their authority to do so.104 Thus, in Stern’s wake, the lower courts strug-
gled with several questions, including, among others: 
1. Drawing the line between “core” claims that bankruptcy courts have the 
power to adjudicate without all of the parties’ consent and “core” claims 
they may not hear and decide (so-called “Stern claims”) under Article III;105 
2. Whether bankruptcy courts may adjudicate Stern claims with the consent 
of the parties consistent with Article III;106 and 
3. Whether Article III may be satisfied if district courts approach bankrupt-
cy court decisions concerning Stern claims as reports and recommendations 
subject to de novo review.107 
Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison108 brought the second and third is-
sues before the Court during the October 2013 term.109 Arkison centered on a Chap-
ter 7 trustee’s fraudulent conveyance suit against the former owner and principal of 
the debtor (Paleveda) and a new company Executive Benefits Insurance Agency 
(EBIA) to which certain assets of the debtor had been transferred.110 The bankruptcy 
court granted the trustee’s motion for summary judgment against EBIA, and EBIA 
appealed.111 The district court  reviewed the record de novo and separately entered 
 102. Id. at 2620. 
 103. In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 104. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2014). 
 105. Id. at 2172–73. See also infra notes 121–24 and accompany text. 
 106. Id. at 2172. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) permits a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a claim to final judgment 
in core proceedings per Section 157(b) and in non-core proceedings with the consent of all parties per § 
157(c)(2), id. at 2174, but Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) did not address how bankruptcy courts 
should proceed under circumstances when a core claim may not be adjudicated under § 157(b), id. at 2172 
(emphasis added). 
 107. Id. at 2168. Arkison resolved the unanswered adjudication issue from Stern, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 
157 (1988) nevertheless permitted bankruptcy courts to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to be reviewed de novo by the district court. Id. 
 108. 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014). 
 109. Id. at 2165, 2172. See also supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
 110. Id. at 2169. 
 111. Id. 
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judgment in favor of the trustee.112 EBIA appealed to the Ninth Circuit. After EBIA 
filed its opening brief, the Supreme Court entered its decision in Stern.113 EBIA sub-
sequently moved to dismiss its appeal, arguing that Article III does not authorize 
bankruptcy courts to enter final orders in fraudulent conveyance disputes.114 
The Ninth Circuit rejected EBIA’s argument and affirmed the judgment in favor 
of the trustee, Arkison.115 Taking together the Supreme Court’s guidance in Stern 
and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,116 the appellate panel characterized the fraudu-
lent conveyance action as one involving a private right.117 First, the panel concluded 
that EBIA impliedly consented to adjudication before the bankruptcy court.118 Sec-
ond, it reasoned that the bankruptcy court’s judgment could “be treated as pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject to de novo review by the Dis-
trict Court.”119 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to both issues, but Justice 
Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, resolved the matter solely on the second.120 
The Court noted that many lower courts “have described Stern claims as creating a 
statutory ‘gap.’”121 Under this reasoning, a Stern claim may not be adjudicated in 
bankruptcy court like other claims that are designated as “core” under 28 U.S.C. § 
157.122 Yet the statute also seemed to limit the submission of proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review only to claims 
that are designated as “non-core” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).123 In light of this “statu-
tory gap,” some lower courts reasoned that district courts were required “to hear all 
Stern claims in the first instance.”124 
The Court rejected the argument that Stern claims fall into any sort of “statutory 
gap.”125 Rather, since 28 U.S.C. § 151126 explicitly provides for the severability of 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2169 (2014). 
 115. Id. 
 116. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 117. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2169. Granfinanciera held that a fraudulent conveyance claim under Title 11 is 
not a matter of public right for purposes of Article III. Id. at 2169, n.3. 
 118. Id. at 2169. 
 119. Id. at 2172. 
 120. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2170, n.4 (2014). Given the Court’s determina-
tion that de novo review and entry of judgment was constitutionally sufficient, it did not address whether EBIA 
consented to bankruptcy court adjudication or if “Article III permits a bankruptcy court, with the consent of 
the parties, to enter a final judgment on a Stern claim.” Id. 
 121. Id. at 2172. 
 122. Id. at 2172–73. 
 123. Id. at 2173. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984). Section entitled “separability” provides that “If any provision of this Act or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the application 
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provisions that are invalidated, Stern claims such as the fraudulent conveyance ac-
tion in Arkison proceed as non-core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c).127 
This did not fully resolve the matter, however, because the lower courts did not 
follow the approach for adjudicating non-core claims under section 157(c).128 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that EBIA received the review it was entitled to 
under Article III.129 Specifically, after the district court reviewed the matter de novo, 
it issued a reasoned opinion noting that “there were no disputed issues of material 
fact and that the trustee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”130 Consistent 
with its statutory authority over bankruptcy matters, the district court entered a 
separate judgment in favor of the trustee.131 Thus, EBIA “received the same review 
from the District Court that it would have received if the Bankruptcy Court had 
treated the fraudulent conveyance claims as non-core proceedings under § 
157(c)(1).”132 
Arkison provided some much needed guidance concerning the adjudication of 
Stern claims. The decision reinforced that bankruptcy courts may hear, but not de-
cide, Stern claims as adjuncts to the district courts.133 Thus, when district courts en-
ter separate judgments following de novo review, Article III is satisfied even where 
the process outlined in section 157(c) has not been followed to the letter.134 Moreo-
ver, Arkison confirmed that standing orders directing bankruptcy courts to treat 
Stern claims as non-core claims, as adopted by some jurisdictions, are consistent 
with the constitutional and statutory framework.135 
D. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 
Many in the bankruptcy community were disappointed that Arkison did not address 
whether bankruptcy courts could enter final judgments with respect to Stern claims 
given litigants’ consent.136 By the time the Court considered Arkison, two other Cir-
of that provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, is not affected 
thereby.”  
 127. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014). 
 128. Id. at 2172–73 (citing the Ninth Circuit’s failure to proceed with the Stern claim as “non-core” as an 
example of the routine failure of federal courts to do so post-Stern). 
 129. Id. at 2175. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165,  2173 (2014). 
 134. Id. at 2174–75. 
 135. Id. at 2173. E.g., In re Standing Order of Reference re: Title 11, No. 12-MISC-32 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 
2012). 
 136. See, e.g., Richard L. Costella & Kristen M. Siracusa, Colusa Mushroom: Is Clarity on Court Jurisdiction 
Beginning to Bloom Post-Bellingham?, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, (2014) (following the grant of certiorari in 
Arkison, the bankruptcy community “eagerly expected additional guidance from the Court on the issues of 
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cuit courts – the Sixth137 and the Seventh138 – had concluded that litigant consent 
could not cure the constitutional deficiency. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to the contrary remained unaltered by Arkison.139 The bankruptcy commu-
nity did not need to wait long for this issue to be addressed; the Court granted 
Wellness International’s petition for a writ of certiorari three weeks after Arkison 
was decided.140 
Wellness involved an adversary proceeding initiated by Wellness International, in 
which the company sought, among other things, a declaration that a trust overseen 
by the Chapter 7 debtor (Sharif) was his alter ego and, accordingly, that the trust’s 
assets were property of the estate.141 The bankruptcy court entered a default judg-
ment in favor of Wellness International, and Sharif appealed.142 
The Court decided Stern prior to the briefing in the appeal, but Sharif neglected 
to mention the opinion in his brief.143 After briefing was complete, Sharif asserted 
that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter a final order in 
the dispute under Stern and, accordingly, that the district court should treat the 
bankruptcy court’s order as a report and recommendation.144 The district court re-
fused to consider the argument because it was not raised in a timely manner and 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.145 
The Seventh Circuit reversed.146 The panel drew upon the Stern majority’s dis-
cussion of the structural interests implicated by the design of the bankruptcy court 
system, and reasoned that Sharif could raise the argument at any time on appeal.147 
The panel further concluded that: (i) the limitation on bankruptcy court authority 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction that have been confounding both lawyers and judges since Stern was decided,” 
but the Court “sidestepped” the consent question). 
 137. Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 138. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 766 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 139. Compare In re Bellingham Ins. Agency v. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, 702 F.3d 553, 567 (9th Cir. 2012), 
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014) (holding noncreditor consent to have non-core issues decided in bankruptcy court 
sufficient to permit bankruptcy judge to make a final judgment) with Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 
S. Ct. 2165, 2175 (2014) (ducking the question of whether noncreditor consent cures constitutional defect). The 
Seventh Circuit also rejected the district courts’ practice of treating bankruptcy court orders in Stern matters as 
reports and recommendations subject to de novo review because Title 28 does not authorize bankruptcy courts 
to hear such matters. Wellness, 727 F.3d at 776 (7th Cir. 2013). In light of this “statutory gap,” the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the reference to the bankruptcy court must be immediately withdrawn and tried before the 
district court. Id. at 776. As noted in the previous section, the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Arkison 
effectively closed this statutory gap. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 140. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3496 (July 
1, 2014) (No. 13-935). 
 141. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1940 (2015). 
 142. Id. at 1941. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 768 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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to decide Stern claims may not be cured by litigant consent;148 (ii) the bankruptcy 
court exceeded its constitutional authority in ruling on the alter ego claim because 
it stemmed from state law rather than from the bankruptcy itself and was “indistin-
guishable from the tortious-interference counterclaim in Stern;”149 and (iii) Sharif’s 
proposed remedy – requiring the district court to treat the bankruptcy court order 
as a report and recommendation – was not authorized if the alter ego claim was not 
“non-core” under Title 28 (the “statutory gap” rationale subsequently rejected in 
Arkison).150 Given the absence of any briefing on the last issue, the Seventh Circuit 
remanded with instructions for the district court to “determine whether the alter-
ego claim is a core or non-core proceeding.”151 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions: 
1. Whether the presence of a subsidiary state property law issue in a 11 
U.S.C. § 541 action brought against a debtor to determine whether property 
in the debtor’s possession is property of the bankruptcy estate means that 
such action does not “stem[] from the bankruptcy itself” and therefore, that 
a bankruptcy court does not have the constitutional authority to enter a fi-
nal order deciding that action. 
2. Whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the Unit-
ed States by the bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and if so, 
whether implied consent based on a litigant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy 
Article III.152 
Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice Sotomayor focused on the second question 
regarding consent, and noted at the outset that adjudication by consent is “nothing 
new.”153 Congress established non-Article III forums to assist litigants with the reso-
lution of their disputes, and the litigants are free to choose whether they will make 
use of these forums.154 Drawing upon precedent in cases involving other alternative 
forums,155 the majority stressed that this choice – the decision to consent or with-
 148. Id. at 771. 
 149. Id. at 774–75. 
 150. Id. at 776–77. 
 151. Id. at 777. 
 152. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3496 (July 
1, 2014) (No. 13-935). 
 153. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942 (2015). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1942–44 (discussing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Gomez 
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991)). 
 S. Todd Brown 
Vol. 11, No. 1 2016 41 
hold consent – demonstrated that the right to an Article III adjudicator is personal 
and thus subject to waiver.156 
With respect to the second prong of the consent question – whether consent 
must be express or may be implied – the majority ultimately concluded that consent 
may be implied, so long as it is knowing and voluntary.157 The majority stressed that 
“it is good practice for courts to seek express statements of consent or nonconsent,” 
and statutes and procedural rules “may require express consent even where the 
Constitution does not.”158 Although the question before the Court centered on what 
Article III requires, the majority’s analysis centered on precedent that addressed only 
the constitutional parameters of consent.159 A conclusion that the Constitution re-
quires express consent, “would be in great tension” with the Court’s prior determi-
nation that “‘the Article III right is substantially honored’ by permitting waiver 
based on ‘actions rather than words.’”160 
The three dissenting justices would have also reversed and remanded on the first 
question, concluding that the alter ego claim against Sharif fell well within the core 
of the bankruptcy power.161 However, the dissenting justices vigorously rejected the 
majority’s reasoning regarding the question of litigation consent. Specifically, the 
Chief Justice noted that framers viewed separation of powers as “sacred.”162 In “dif-
fusing federal powers among three different branches, and by protecting each 
branch against incursions from the others, the Framers devised a structure of gov-
ernment that promotes both liberty and accountability.”163 In light of the institu-
tional interests that this design serves and the values it protects – interests and val-
ues that do “not belong to any branch of the Government but to the Nation as a 
whole” – no branch has the power to “consent to a violation of the separation of 
powers.”164 If no branch may consent to such a violation, “surely a private litigant 
may not do so.”165 Even in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,166 a de-
cision the majority relied upon extensively, the Court acknowledged that litigant 
consent is insufficient when “the structural component of Article III ‘is implicat-
 156. Id. at 1944. 
 157. Id. at 1948 (“It bears emphasizing, however, that a litigant’s consent—whether express or implied—
must still be knowing and voluntary.”). 
 158. Id. at 1948 n.13. 
 159. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932,  1947–48 (2015) (discussing the implied consent 
standard articulated in Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 589, 590 (2003) and explaining that “[n]othing in the 
Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express”). 
 160. Id. at 1947–48 (quoting Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 589, 590 (2003)). 
 161. Id. at 1953–54 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 1954 (quoting James Madison, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
 163. Id. at 1954. 
 164. Id. at 1955. 
 165. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1955 (2015). 
 166. See discussion of Schor in the introduction to Part II, infra.  
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ed.’”167 Thus, Stern expressly found that authorizing non-Article III courts to adju-
dicate the counterclaims at issue in that case would “compromise the integrity of 
the system of separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system.”168 In 
sum, “allowing bankruptcy courts to decide Stern claims by consent would imper-
missibly threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”169 
The Chief Justice characterized the majority’s rationale as involving “an imagi-
native reconstruction of Stern,” which, as noted, he authored four years earlier.170 
Although Stern referenced the fact that Pierce “did not truly consent” to resolution 
of the counterclaims in bankruptcy court, this was one of many facts which distin-
guished Stern from other proceedings.171 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts stressed 
the holding was grounded in the understanding that Pierce could not have consent-
ed “given the nature of bankruptcy.”172 
Of course, the dissenting justices’ views are not binding on the lower courts, but 
they are significant – and perhaps surprising – in what they suggest about congres-
sional authority to assign certain matters to non-Article III tribunals without con-
sent of the parties.173 Notwithstanding the Chief Justice’s strong reservations about 
intrusions into the judicial function, he expressly conceded that non-Article III ad-
judicators may preside over certain bankruptcy proceedings consistent with Article 
III.174 Justice Scalia joined in the Wellness International dissent, which suggests that 
he is not as strongly opposed to a narrow bankruptcy exception as may have been 
previously thought.175 Justice Thomas did not join the Chief Justice’s discussion of 
the public rights exception,176 yet he too observed: “No doubt certain aspects of 
bankruptcy involve rights lying outside the core of the judicial power.”177 Among 
these rights, he noted the right to discharge and the claims allowance process.178 Ra-
 167. Wellness, 135 at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986)). 
 168. Id. (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011)). 
 169. Id. at 1957. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1957 (2015)  (explaining that the “one affirma-
tive reference to the lack of consent . . .  came amid a long list of factors distinguishing the proceeding in Stern 
from the proceedings in Schor and other ‘public rights’ cases”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. at 1957–58 (“It is a fundamental principle that no branch of government can delegate its consti-
tutional functions to an actor who lacks authority to exercise those functions. Such delegations threaten liberty 
and thwart accountability by empowering entities that lack the structural protections the Framers carefully de-
vised.”). 
 174. Id. at 1952. 
 175. See id. at 1950. 
 176. See id. He did join, however, in Part I, which rejected the majority’s consent rationale. 
 177. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1967 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. at 1967 (describing the right to discharge as “[t]he most obvious” of those rights “lying outside the 
core of the judicial power” and opining that, “together with the claims allowance process that proceeds it, [the 
right to discharge] can act conclusively on the core private rights of the debtors’ creditors”). 
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ther than attempt to squeeze these bankruptcy exceptions into the public rights 
doctrine, he suggested that “bankruptcy courts and their predecessors more likely 
enjoy a unique, textually based exception, much like territorial courts and courts-
martial do.”179 
II. Analysis: Bankruptcy Rights, Coercion and Consent 
Where does the Court’s recent attention to the intersection of Article III and the 
bankruptcy power leave the bankruptcy system? Part of the difficulty in answering 
this question – and, specifically, defining the public rights doctrine – is the extent to 
which the Court’s discussions of consensual and non-consensual adjudication over-
lap. The Court has consistently stressed the former in finding non-Article III adju-
dication consistent with the Constitution.180 Only rarely has it found that such adju-
dication complies with the dictates of Article III in the absence of express or implied 
consent.181 
Thus, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,182 the Court found 
that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) acted within its consti-
tutional authority by exercising jurisdiction over state law counterclaims in a for-
mer client’s action against its former broker.183 Although acknowledging that adju-
dication over the counterclaim broke from the traditional agency model, the 
majority refused “to endorse an absolute prohibition on such jurisdiction out of 
fear of where some hypothetical ‘slippery slope’ may deposit us.”184 Moreover, the 
plaintiff consented to the CFTC’s jurisdiction when he pursued an administrative 
resolution of his claim against the broker and expressly demanded that the broker 
litigate the counterclaim in the administrative proceeding.185 Drawing upon the rea-
soning of Katchen v. Landry,186 a case under the Bankruptcy Act, the Court reasoned 
that Congress could empower the non-Article III tribunal to preside over counter-
claims that “arose out of the same transaction.”187 
In the absence of consent, non-Article III tribunals have been deemed constitu-
tional only where they exercised exceedingly limited, specialized authority to decide 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985) (holding that FIFRA’s 
binding arbitration provision, a non-Article III adjudication, did not violate the Constitution); Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (holding that the authority of the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission to hear state counterclaims, a non-Article III adjudication, did not violate the Con-
stitution when litigants consented). 
 181. See infra note 184. 
 182. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 183. Id. at 845. 
 184. Id. at 852. 
 185. Id. at 850. 
 186. 382 U.S. 323 (1966). 
 187. Schor, 478 U.S. at 852. 
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questions that could have easily been subject to legislative action.188 In Thomas v. 
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., for example, the Court characterized the 
Northern Pipeline plurality as “establish[ing] only that Congress may not vest in a 
non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue 
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without con-
sent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.”189 Thomas in-
volved a requirement under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) that registrants submit data-sharing compensation disputes to binding ar-
bitration.190 Under FIFRA, registrants must submit research data concerning a pesti-
cide’s health, safety, and environmental effects to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).191 Compiling and filing this data can be expensive, and FIFRA re-
quires subsequent registrants to compensate first submitters for the use of their da-
ta.192 Where these costs were disputed, FIFRA provided that either party could in-
voke binding arbitration.193 In upholding this framework, the Court reasoned that 
“the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when 
Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclu-
sively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of en-
croaching on the judicial powers is reduced.”194 
In Northern Pipeline, Stern, and Wellness, the Court stressed this distinction.195 
Indeed, it is possible that this distinction was critical to one or both of the justices196 
who sided with the majorities in both Stern (nonconsensual and exceeded the con-
stitutional authority) and Wellness (consensual and within the limits of Article III). 
This section thus distinguishes cases that centered on litigant consent from those 
that authorized Article I adjudication without consent.197 In the process, this discus-
sion demonstrates that some seemingly clear divisions in the Court’s decisions are, 
at best, fuzzy and suggests a nuanced interpretation of the Court’s seemingly in-
compatible visions of consent in Wellness and Stern.198 From there, this section 
 188. See supra note 184. 
 189. 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985). 
 190. Id. at 571.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 572. 
 193. Id. at 573. 
 194. Id. at 589 (quoting N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 62 (1982)). For 
much the same reason, Justice Brennan found that this framework withstood scrutiny under the Northern Pipe-
line standard. See id. at 600–01 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Although a compensation dispute under FIFRA ul-
timately involves a determination of the duty owed one private party by another, at its heart the dispute in-
volves the exercise of authority by a Federal Government arbitrator in the course of administration of FIFRA’s 
comprehensive regulatory scheme. As such it partakes of the characteristics of a standard agency adjudication”). 
 195. See supra Sections I.A–I.C. 
 196. Justices Kennedy and Alito sided with the majority in both cases. 
 197. See infra Sections II.A–II.C. 
 198. See infra Sections II.A–II.C. 
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touches upon the long-standing question of whether de novo review actually ad-
vances the objectives of Article III.199 
A. Mandatory Adjudication and Bankruptcy Rights 
To suggest that Thomas and Schor indicate the demise of Northern Pipeline is an 
oversimplification. Northern Pipeline presented a unique and significant separation 
of powers problem for the Court because (i) the Bankruptcy Code embraced the 
“most expansive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in our history”200 and (ii) for the 
first time, it empowered judges lacking the protections of Article III to adjudicate 
substantially all of the proceedings that fell within this jurisdiction.201 Although any 
one proceeding or type of proceeding may not have suggested a break from Article 
III, the bankruptcy courts’ statutory authority was hardly limited to allocating the 
costs of a public scheme (as in Thomas)202 or resolving claims that are “completely 
dependent upon adjudication of [reparation] claim[s] created by federal law” (as in 
Schor).203 The Court’s subsequent decisions in this area similarly reflect discomfort 
with reframing private rights matters (subject to Article III protections in the feder-
al system) as questions of public right (subject to summary adjudication, perhaps 
before an Article I judge) merely due to the bankruptcy of one of the parties.204 
The Court has not rejected the idea that the power to “[establish] laws with re-
spect to the subject of bankruptcies” includes a legislative power to create special-
ized Article I courts to administer bankruptcy cases.205 Justice Brennan’s plurality 
opinion in Northern Pipeline noted that legislative courts have historically been lim-
ited to the review of “matters arising between the Government and persons subject 
to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions 
of the executive or legislative departments, and only to matters that historically 
could have been determined exclusively by those departments.”206 In Northern Pipe-
line and again in Granfinanciera, the Court acknowledged that “public rights” need 
not be a matter “between the government and others.”207 At most, the Court has (i) 
 199. See infra Section II.C. 
 200. Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitu-
tional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 790 (2000). 
 201. N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53–54 (1982). 
 202. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).  
 203. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986). 
 204. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 
55–56 (1989); Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. As noted in Part II.A.2.b, infra, even justices who have previously expressed 
doubts on this question appeared to reverse course in Wellness. 
 206. N. Pipeline , 458 U.S. at 67–68. 
 207. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54; N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69. But see Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 66 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“The notion that the power to adjudicate a legal controversy between two private parties may be 
assigned to a non-Article III, yet federal, tribunal is entirely inconsistent with the origins of the public rights 
doctrine.”). 
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operated from the premise that such a legislative power exists and (ii) identified cer-
tain actions that fall outside that power.208 
Yet the Court’s guidance concerning the parameters of congressional power to 
assign adjudicative authority to bankruptcy courts has been sparse. Granfinanciera, 
borrowing from Thomas, acknowledged that a “seemingly ‘private’ right” may be 
“so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate 
for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”209 By 
contrast, where “a statutory right is not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory 
program Congress has power to enact, and if that right neither belongs to nor exists 
against the Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated by an Article III 
court.”210 Thus, the Court has recognized that there is some degree of overlap be-
tween legislative, executive and judicial functions, but how far do these gray areas 
extend? 
Historical practice ostensibly provides some additional guidance, but it, too, is 
limited. In Stern, the majority distinguished public rights that Congress may create 
and elect against “bring[ing] within the cognizance of the courts of the United 
States,” from private rights that Congress “cannot ‘withdraw from judicial cogni-
zance.’”211 The latter include any matter that, “from its nature, is the subject of a suit 
at common law, or in equity, or admiralty.”212 For much of American colonial histo-
ry, however, there was “no separation between executive, legislative and judicial 
roles” generally, and the “distinctions between different bodies or courts were 
blurred.”213 Thus, certain functions that might be considered “judicial” today were 
left to quasi-judicial officers in bankruptcy214 and other matters.215 
Similarly, some have suggested that the design of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800216 
(1800 Act) demonstrates that the early Congresses understood that several seeming-
 208. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54 (“The crucial question, in cases not involving the Federal Govern-
ment, is whether ‘Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under 
Article I, [has] create[d] a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme 
as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.’”). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 54–55. 
 211. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2612 (2011). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGL. HIST. 253, 253, 260–61 (1967) 
(“The judicial systems of American colonies present a pattern unfamiliar to the modern lawyer. The first strik-
ing feature was the lack of separation of powers between the different functions of government, a principle 
which is accepted today as fundamental.”). 
 214. See generally Ralph Brubaker, A “Summary” Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges’ 
Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 121 (2012); Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy 
Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567 (1998) (analyzing English and early 
American bankruptcy laws). 
 215. See Surrency, supra note 213. 
 216. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (amended 1801, 1802 and repealed 1803). 
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ly judicial functions in bankruptcy did not fall within the judicial power.217 Specifi-
cally, the 1800 Act empowered commissioners, who were not Article III judges, to 
engage in certain administrative and judicial functions.218 The latter included, 
among other things, the ability to: (i) summon and interrogate those believed to be 
in possession of the bankrupt’s property, issue warrants to those who did not ap-
pear, and commit them and others who refused to answer to prison;219 (ii) make the 
initial determination as to whether the person charged was a bankrupt under the 
Act;220 (iii) allow creditors to prove their debts;221 (iv) order the distribution of the 
estate;222 (v) certify to the district judge that the requirements for discharge were sat-
isfied;223 and (v) authorize the release of the bankrupt from prison.224 
The powers that the 1800 Act withheld or authorized only with the consent of 
the parties are equally telling. The commissioner took possession of the bankrupt’s 
property, books, and records which were subsequently transferred to assignees for 
administration.225 Assignees were authorized to stand in the shoes of the bankrupt 
for the purpose of collecting debts owed to him, but the 1800 Act did not provide 
for a resolution of these disputes before the commissioner.226 Moreover, any credi-
tor of the bankrupt could (i) refuse to submit his claim to the judgment of the 
commissioner and (ii) demand a jury trial before the circuit court.227 Thus, although 
the 1800 Act adopted certain extra-judicial means of administering bankruptcy cas-
es, disputes that had been handled by the superior courts of England were reserved 
to the federal trial courts under the 1800 Act.228 
Given the framers’ focus on delineating the different functions of government as 
a means of limiting the powers of each branch, it is unsurprising that at least some 
members of the Court have erred on the side of limiting potential encroachments 
into the judicial role, even though colonial and early post-colonial practice may 
have assigned some seemingly judicial functions to non-judicial or quasi-judicial 
 217. See, e.g., Plank, supra note 214, at 606 (“The actions taken shortly after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion confirm the framers’ understanding of the benefits and permissibility of a summary bankruptcy procedure 
by non-Article III judges with a right of review by an Article III judge.”). 
 218. Id. at 607–09. 
 219. 1800 Act, §§ 14–15. 
 220. Id. at § 3. 
 221. Id. at § 6. 
 222. Id. at §§ 29–30. 
 223. Id. at § 36. However, the district judge was authorized the issue the discharge where such a certification 
was “unreasonably denied.” Id. 
 224. Id. at § 60. 
 225. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 5. 
 226. Id. at § 13. 
 227. Id. at § 58. 
 228. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 643, 719-20 (2004). This distinction between extra-judicial administrative functions and judicial 
functions “evolved into the familiar bankruptcy distinction between ‘summary’ and ‘plenary’ proceedings.” Id. 
at 719. 
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officers.229 At most, colonial practice and the 1800 Act support the view that certain 
matters referred to bankruptcy courts under the Code need not be decided by Arti-
cle III courts, but matters that the Court has treated as involving primarily private 
rights may not be adjudicated by non-Article III courts without consent. 
Even with the Court’s limited direct guidance concerning the parameters of 
bankruptcy rights, some lines have been drawn. Stern reinforced the Court’s dis-
tinction between “rights that are (a) created by the legislative scheme to restructure 
debtor-creditor relations; (b) necessarily incorporated as part of the substantive de-
sign of that scheme; and (c) private matters, regardless of whether they are relabeled 
under the Code.”230 The remainder of the discussion analyzes these disputes sepa-
rately. 
1. Applying the Express Provisions of Bankruptcy Law 
Some rights – including eligibility for bankruptcy relief, automatic stay, dismissal, 
conversion to another chapter, administrative provisions concerning the appoint-
ment and duties of the trustee and estate professionals, and the right to a discharge 
and limitations on that right – are creations of bankruptcy law and are central to its 
operation.231 To that end, the power of the bankruptcy courts to hear and decide 
disputes concerning most aspects of bankruptcy administration appears to be unaf-
fected by Northern Pipeline and subsequent decisions.232 
To date, however, the Court has consistently framed fraudulent conveyance ac-
tions as those involving private rights, notwithstanding the fact that such actions are 
incorporated into bankruptcy law.233 For example, in Granfinanciera, the Court re-
jected the suggestion that actions to recover fraudulent conveyances, which are in-
corporated in the Bankruptcy Code, transformed the existing private right to such 
actions under state law into “public rights” that could be adjudicated by bankruptcy 
courts without consent of the parties.234 Congress did not “create a new cause of ac-
tion, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law.”235 “Rather, Congress 
simply reclassified a pre-existing, common-law cause of action that was not inte-
 229. See Surrency, supra note 213; see also Brubaker, supra note 214. 
 230. Brown, supra note 30, at 214. 
 231. See, e.g., In re USA Baby, Inc., 674 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2012) (conversion); In re City of Detroit, 498 
B.R. 776, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (eligibility); Calderon v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Calderon), 497 B.R. 
558, 567 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2013) (seeking damages for violation of the automatic stay); Mahanna v. Bynum, 
465 B.R. 436 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2011)(dismissal); Turner v. First Cmty. Credit Union (In re Turner), 462 B.R. 
214 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 11, 2011) (automatic stay). 
 232. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 
752 (2010). 
 233. Id. at 769. 
 234. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. at 51–52. 
 235. Id. at 60 (quoting Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 
442, 461 (1977)). 
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grally related to the reformation of debtor-creditor relations.”236 It was a “purely 
taxonomic change” that did not alter the underlying nature of the right.237 
The classification of preference actions is more challenging. On the one hand, 
preferences are unique to bankruptcy law even if they are commonly brought in 
conjunction with fraudulent conveyance actions.238 As the name suggests, a prefer-
ence action asserts that a debtor took steps prior to the commencement of his case 
that effectively preferred certain creditors over others.239 Specifically, in paying cer-
tain debts and not paying others, the debtor ensured that the former received pay-
ments from a limited fund (the assets of the debtor) that, under the bankruptcy 
priority scheme, should have been shared with other creditors.240 To address this po-
tential for abuse, the preference provisions of bankruptcy law afford the estate dis-
tinct and separate grounds for recovering these payments even where they may not 
be subject to recovery in a common law fraudulent conveyance action.241 Thus, 
some have suggested that preference actions are public rights subject to adjudica-
tion by non-Article III courts.242 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has suggested that defendants in prefer-
ence actions do not involve public rights. In Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., the 
Court reasoned that preference suits “constitute no part of the proceedings in bank-
ruptcy but concern controversies arising out of it.”243 In Langenkamp v. Culp, the 
Court noted, in dicta, that a preference defendant who has not filed a proof of claim 
is entitled to a jury trial because the action “amounts to a legal action to recover a 
monetary transfer.”244 Moreover, it may be difficult to reconcile a system that treats 
fraudulent conveyances as private rights and preference actions as public rights 
 236. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 60. 
 237. Id. at 61. 
 238. See Frank v. Michigan ex rel. Mich. Unemployment Agency Dep’t of Consumer & Indus. Servs., 263 
B.R. 538, 542 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (stating that preferences actions are unique bankruptcy devices). 
 239. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Burtch v. Seaport Capital, LLC (In re Direct Response Media, Inc.), 466 B.R. 626, 644 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2012) (“The Court adopts the Narrow Interpretation and holds that Stern only removed a non-Article III 
court’s authority to finally adjudicate one type of core matter, a debtor’s state law counterclaim asserted under § 
157(b)(2)(C). By extension, the Court concludes that Stern does not remove the bankruptcy courts’ authority to 
enter final judgments on other core matters, including the authority to finally adjudicate preference and fraudu-
lent conveyance actions like those at issue before this Court.”); In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P., 
465 B.R. 452, 463 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (“The entire purpose of the cause of action, then, is to enforce the 
Bankruptcy Code’s equality of distribution. In this respect, preferential transfer actions are fundamentally dif-
ferent from fraudulent transfer actions, although the two causes of action superficially resembleFalse Fraudulent 
transfer actions are not necessarily asserted against entities that were ever legitimate creditors of the debtor. 
Preferential transfer actions, in contrast, are part of the administration of the estate: they are concerned with 
determining the amounts of claims under the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 243. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94–95 (1932). 
 244. 498 U.S. 42, 45 (1990). 
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notwithstanding their distinct foundations in the law.245 Thus, several courts have 
concluded that efforts to augment the estate through a preference action involve 
private rights and, accordingly, must be heard by an Article III court.246 
2. Questions of Private Right that Inform Bankruptcy Law 
Some common proceedings in bankruptcy – including the claim allowance process 
and certain individual debtor exemptions – refer to non-bankruptcy law merely to 
inform the understanding and consideration of rights that are created under the 
Code.247 Where the underlying rights are not in dispute, administration of these 
claims appears largely indistinguishable from the administration of other questions 
that arise under bankruptcy law. Conversely, as noted previously, resolving disput-
ed questions concerning these underlying rights before a non-Article III adjudicator 
has not always been available in the absence of litigant consent.248 
One example of the uncertain lines between public and private rights in bank-
ruptcy is the bankruptcy court’s authority to decide whether property qualifies as 
property of the estate. This is a question of federal bankruptcy law, but section 541 
of the Code (i) looks to the debtor’s rights under non-bankruptcy law to identify 
the nature of the debtor’s interests in property249 and (ii) does not purport to alter 
these non-bankruptcy rights.250 Where these non-bankruptcy rights are not in dis-
pute, the question is simply whether the Code treats the relevant property interest 
as property of the estate.251 
However, where the underlying property right is unliquidated and disputed, a 
strict reading of the public rights cases may suggest a need for Article III adjudica-
tion. Although there is no doubt that the trustee succeeds to the debtor’s interest in 
 245. See Moyer v. Koloseik (In re Sutton), 470 B.R. 462, 471 n.29 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012) (“Is this aspect 
of the bankruptcy process any more a public right than the collection of a receivable, which is certainly another 
crucial aspect of the process? Or, to put it differently, why is the recipient of a million dollar preference not enti-
tled to the same protection of an Article III judge as the guy who owes the estate $20 on an open account?”). 
This may be particularly troublesome given that the overwhelming majority of modern bankruptcy cases are 
voluntary and similar questions, such as creditor arrangements, were historically overseen by common law 
courts. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., In re Innovative Commc’n Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73592, at *10 (D.V.I. May 30, 2014) 
(finding preference actions are not public rights subject to bankruptcy court adjudication); see also Pryor v. 
Tromba, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47969, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2014); Penson Fin. Servs. v. O’Connell (In re 
Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP), 479 B.R. 254, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 247. Brown, supra note 30, at 214–15. 
 248. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 58, 2 Stat. 19, 35 (repealed 1803). 
 249. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bill Barry Enters., Inc., 822 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 250. See, e.g., In re Jones, 768 F.2d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The estate’s rights are limited to those had by 
the debtor: ‘whatever rights a debtor had at the commencement of the case continue in bankruptcy—no more, 
no less.’”) (quoting Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 251. See, e.g., Fisher v. Apostolou, 155 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The nature of a debtor’s interest in 
property is determined by state law, but the question whether the resulting interest should count as ‘property of 
the estate’ for § 541 purposes is an issue of federal law.” (citation omitted)). 
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the cause of action, it is not clear whether Congress may empower a bankruptcy 
court to adjudicate the cause of action to augment the estate. Unlike litigating dis-
puted claims against the estate, which will most often arise out of an objection to 
the creditor’s proof of claim,252 the other party may be a stranger to the bankruptcy 
case and refuse to consent to non-Article III adjudication. Thus, although the caus-
es of action in Northern Pipeline and Stern were property of the estate, the bank-
ruptcy courts lacked constitutional authority to hear and decide them. 
There is a certain danger in drawing lines that are too fine or too blunt in this ar-
ea. Northern Pipeline and Stern could be read to bar all actions to augment the es-
tate, save for those that will “necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance pro-
cess.”253 Similarly, if the line to be drawn is between disputed and undisputed rights 
to property, a recalcitrant bankrupt or estate debtor could simply manufacture a 
legal or equitable challenge to the debtor’s ownership, thus transforming liquid es-
tate property into a contested right of action requiring litigation in an Article III or 
state court. 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that Wellness presented such a fact 
pattern:254 the debtor in that case argued that property he previously claimed to own 
was, in fact, property of a trust that he oversaw as trustee.255 Such a “merely colora-
ble” claim to an asset, the Chief Justice noted, was the sort of matter that bankrupt-
cy referees had the power to address under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.256 Thus, the 
alter ego claim was not an attempt to reclaim a right that passed to a third party, as 
in a fraudulent conveyance; it was an action to determine the extent of the estate’s 
interest in property held by the debtor at commencement.257 
 252. Filing a proof of claim has long been sufficient to establish consent to resolution of any underlying 
questions necessary to establish the validity and amount of the claim before the bankruptcy court. See, e.g., 
Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990) (finding that filing a proof of claim triggers the claim allowance 
process and subjects the claimant to the bankruptcy court’s equitable power to decide all matters that are part of 
the process); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 333 n.9 (1966) (“Our decision is governed by the ‘traditional 
bankruptcy law that he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and demand-
ing its allowance must abide the consequences of that procedure.’” (quoting Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 
565, 573 (1947))); (Cent. Vt. PSC v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 2003) (“By filing the proof of claim, the 
creditor consents to the bankruptcy court’s broad equitable jurisdiction.”); In re G.I. Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 1276, 
1280 (9th Cir. 2000) (“By filing the proof of claim, Benedor voluntarily subjected the agreement [underlying the 
claim] to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. . . .”). 
 253. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011). 
 254. 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1953–54 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 255. Id. at 1940 (majority opinion). 
 256. Id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, the power of the referee to adjudicate claims of owner-
ship to property in the actual or constructive possession of the state was recognized under the 1898 Act. See, e.g., 
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931); Isaac v. 
Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931). Likewise, summary adjudication was appropriate where a party 
asserting a merely colorable claim had actual or constructive possession of property. See, e.g., May v. Hender-
son, 268 U.S. 111 (1925); Am. Fin. Co. v. Cuppard, 45 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1930); In re Gant, 52 F.2d 220 
(M.D.N.C. 1931). 
 257. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
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B. Consent 
1. The Personal Right to Article III Adjudication 
As the Wellness majority observed, “[a]djudication by consent is nothing new.”258 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 authorized commissioners to hear and decide claim 
disputes, and claimants were required to opt out of this process if they wanted an 
Article III adjudicator.259 Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the referees’ power to 
adjudicate certain disputes hinged upon express or implied consent.260 
The Constitution requires only that consent be knowing and voluntary.261 In oth-
er contexts, the Court has clarified that “knowing” waivers of constitutional rights 
refers to “intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circum-
stances and likely consequences.”262 “Voluntary” implies that the consent is freely 
given, not subject to undue duress or coercion.263 Although the Wellness majority 
did not go further, precedent provides some insight into the parameters of consent 
in bankruptcy going forward. 
First, express consent, already required for statutory “non-core“ claims under 
the Bankruptcy Rules,264 will be sufficient. Indeed, given the severability analysis in 
Arkison, Justice Alito suggested that this requirement may apply to Stern claims.265 
The Wellness majority also noted that “it is good practice for courts to seek express 
statements of consent or nonconsent, both to ensure irrefutably that any waiver of 
the right to Article III adjudication is knowing and voluntary and to limit subse-
quent litigation over the consent issue.”266 
Second, a reviewing court will likely find knowing and voluntary consent where 
the litigant requests relief in bankruptcy court. This is consistent with Schor, which 
the majority cited extensively,267 and follows from invoking the court’s jurisdiction 
to resolve a dispute. 
 258. Id. at 1942 (majority opinion). 
 259. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 58, 2 Stat. 19, 35 (repealed 1803). 
 260. Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. 
REV. 675, 683 (1985). 
 261. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948. 
 262. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Thus, a party must be aware of a right or privilege in 
order to waive it. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 143 (1967) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938)). 
 263. See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 543 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The 
purported waiver of the right to an Article III trial would not be an acceptable ground for avoiding the constitu-
tional question if the alternative to the waiver were the imposition of serious burdens and costs on the liti-
gant.”). 
 264. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b).  
 265. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1949 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 266. Id. at 1948 n.13 (majority opinion). 
 267. Id. at 1943–45. 
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Third, the Court has previously recognized that filing a proof of claim similarly 
invokes the claims resolution process in bankruptcy and thus indicates consent to 
bankruptcy court adjudication of all matters necessary to consider the claim.268 Alt-
hough some language in Stern may be read to suggest otherwise,269 the majority 
stressed the distinction between resolving a counterclaim that involved the “same 
issue” as the claim allowance process versus inferring litigant consent to address 
numerous other unresolved issues that were not necessarily resolved in that pro-
cess.270 Along the same lines, a debtor’s voluntary commencement of a bankruptcy 
case should suggest knowing and voluntary consent to the adjudication of the debt-
or’s rights in the bankruptcy case. 
Fourth, even where the litigant does not expressly consent to adjudication, con-
sent may be inferred where the litigant is made aware of the need for consent and 
does not withhold it. Roell v. Withrow, which the Wellness majority cited favorably 
in support of its conclusion, is instructive.271 Roell asked whether implied consent to 
adjudication before a magistrate was sufficient under the Constitution.272 The Court 
observed that demanding express consent would present “the risk of a full and 
complicated trial wasted at the option of an undeserving and possibly opportunistic 
litigant.”273 Thus, instead of holding that express consent was necessary for constitu-
tional purposes, the Court reasoned that “the better rule is to accept implied con-
sent where, as here, the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent 
and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the 
Magistrate Judge.”274 
2. The Institutional Interests in Article III Adjudication 
As noted in Part II, the Stern majority stressed the institutional interests protected 
by Article III, and this language suggested that litigant consent was not sufficient to 
overcome the Article III limits on bankruptcy court adjudication.275 Wellness, how-
ever, indicated that these concerns were overblown in the course of finding that 
bankruptcy courts could hear and decide Stern claims with litigant consent.276 
However, reading Wellness as simply reversing Stern oversimplifies the analysis. 
The Stern majority highlights the risk that bankruptcy law and procedure limit liti-
 268. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 (1966) (citing Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U.S. 347, 351 (1876)). 
 269. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 270. 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011). 
 271. 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003). 
 272. Id. at 582. 
 273. Id. at 590. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011). 
 276. 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1947 (2015) (“To hear the principal dissent tell it, the world will end not in fire, or ice, 
but in a bankruptcy court.”). 
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gants’ alternatives for vindicating private rights. An independent judiciary is fun-
damental in the federal system.277 The Court’s interest in preserving independence is 
protected in no small part by limiting the exercise of the “judicial power of the 
United States” to judges with the tenure and salary protections of Article III.278 
Where Congress cannot require adjudication in a non-Article III forum directly, 
inferring “consent” to such adjudication from an act that a litigant must perform to 
have his private right to payment recognized has the same practical effect (in Stern, 
filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 case).279 As the Court has noted elsewhere, 
consent under undue duress, even when generated by governmental authority, is 
not truly voluntary.280 
Contrasting Stern with Wellness on this point is difficult because the latter did 
not ultimately address whether the debtor, Sharif, actually consented to non-Article 
III adjudication.281 At most, we can infer that a majority of the Court is unwilling to 
say that the “nature of bankruptcy” precludes meaningful consent in all cases.282 The 
majority’s emphasis on Roell suggests that it saw the underlying question as more 
one of waiver or forfeiture (e.g., Sharif’s failure to raise an Article III question until 
late in the appeal) rather than consent. 
It may also be possible that some of the justices were swayed by distinctions be-
tween Sharif’s rights and conduct in Wellness and Pierce Marshall’s rights and con-
duct in Stern. It is one thing to say that Congress may condition the debtor’s pursuit 
of a statutory right to discharge upon consent to an administrative forum.283 It is 
another thing entirely to strip a creditor of his pre-existing property rights against 
the debtor unless he “consents” (by filing a proof of claim) to non-Article III adju-
 277. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at *4 (Alexander Hamilton) (WEST, 1788 WL 492). 
 278. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 279. Id. at 1948 (majority opinion) (“‘[T]he Article III right is substantially honored’ by permitting waiver 
based on ‘actions rather than words.’ The implied consent standard articulated in Roell supplies the appropriate 
rule for adjudications by bankruptcy courts under § 157.” (quoting Roell v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696, 1703 
(2003)) (internal citations omitted)). 
 280. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 (finding that one party “did not truly consent to resolution of [the] claim 
in the bankruptcy court proceedings” because “[h]e had nowhere else to go if he wished to recover from [the] 
estate”); Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting “the litigant in Stern did not consent 
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dication of his claim and any other matters that may have some relationship to the 
claim, however tangential those relationships may be.284 
C. Bankruptcy Courts as Adjuncts and de novo Review 
Certain Supreme Court decisions upholding non-Article III adjudication are distin-
guishable from those that rejected non-Article III adjudication in another critical 
respect: the former involved true adjuncts to Article III courts. In Stern, for exam-
ple, the majority stressed that the administrative adjudicator whose role had been 
found constitutionally valid in Crowell v. Benson “had only limited authority to 
make specialized, narrowly confined factual determinations regarding a particular-
ized area of law and to issue orders that could be enforced only by action of the Dis-
trict Court.”285 Similarly, other scholars and practitioners have suggested that the 
problem with comparing modern bankruptcy courts to commissioners under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 is that they “no longer perform an administrative function 
but act solely as neutral and independent tribunals for the resolution of disputes.”286 
This observation was echoed in Stern: 
Nor can the bankruptcy courts under the 1984 Act be dismissed as mere ad-
juncts of Article III courts, any more than could the bankruptcy courts un-
der the 1978 Act. The judicial powers the courts exercise in cases such as this 
remain the same, and a court exercising such broad powers is no mere ad-
junct of anyone.287 
The lower courts have responded, in part, by reviewing cases involving unsettled 
“public rights” questions de novo. The district court in Arkison adopted this philos-
ophy (albeit not in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)), and the Court unani-
mously endorsed the lower courts’ approach.288 With the Court’s blessing, one may 
anticipate that this trend toward treating bankruptcy court orders as proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law in close cases will accelerate. Indeed, even where 
a party expressly withholds consent, “the most likely response will be to have the 
 284. Similar to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit struggled with such an expansive view of consent 
grounded in the filing of a proof of claim. See Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1057 (9th Cir. 
2010). Although the Ninth Circuit framed its decision to avoid a constitutional question, in refusing to rule that 
the counterclaim fell within the bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit stressed the same consti-
tutional concerns as the Supreme Court majority. Compare id. at 1058-59, with Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611. 
 285. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2612 n.6. 
 286. Pfander, supra note 228, at 770. 
 287. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011). 
 288. See supra Section I.C. 
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bankruptcy judge hear the matter and submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law to the district judge.”289 
As Lawrence P. King noted upon the passage of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amend-
ments, this approach “is rife with problems and temptations.”290 The “major temp-
tation is for the district court to rubber-stamp the proposed findings and conclu-
sions of the bankruptcy judge.”291 To date, however, the Court has not been 
presented with an opportunity to test how far a district court must go to satisfy Ar-
ticle III through de novo review. This is not terribly surprising given that any court 
that does little or no more than it would in an ordinary appeal is unlikely to tip its 
hand. In such cases, the “constitutional protection for [A]rticle III judges to adjudi-
cate noncore proceedings has been accomplished semantically and cosmetically. 
Little or no change actually will occur.”292 
Conclusion 
The current bankruptcy law originally assumed that the bankruptcy courts would 
exercise broad jurisdiction over all matters arising in, arising under and related to 
any given bankruptcy case.293 They were not mere adjuncts to Article III courts, and 
their power to hear and decide matters did not generally hinge upon the litigants’ 
consent.294 They were courts in every meaningful sense, though bankruptcy judges 
lacked the tenure and salary protections of Article III.295 After Northern Pipeline, 
Congress attempted to preserve as much of this system as possible by broadly defin-
ing “core” claims.296 Although this approach may not have captured the constitu-
tional limits of bankruptcy court power correctly, the core/non-core distinction 
provided much needed guidance for practitioners and the courts.297 
Stern undermined the predictability of the statutory core/non-core division of 
power; in its wake, seemingly any “core” claim could be subject to challenge.298 As 
noted in Part II.A-B, even questions that are central to bankruptcy administration 
are not above challenge. Moreover, in the time since Stern, the Court has provided 
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little guidance concerning the questions that bankruptcy courts may decide in the 
absence of litigant consent.299 
Even so, the Court’s recent decisions suggest a partial return to pre-Stern nor-
malcy.300 Members of the Court appear to tolerate a bankruptcy exception to Article 
III, and Wellness reinforced that litigants are free to litigate in bankruptcy court but 
in so doing, may be bound by the court’s decision.301 The limits of both bases for 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction remain unclear. Arkison provided a roadmap for con-
verting the statutory design into one where bankruptcy courts truly act as adjuncts 
in non-core matters.302 Yet in so doing, Arkison also enhanced the likelihood that 
cases at the margins will be treated as non-core by default and subject to de novo 
review.303 This should serve to reduce Stern claim appeals beyond the district 
courts,304 but also suggests that the Court will have fewer opportunities to clarify the 
bankruptcy public rights framework in the future.305 
In sum, the current bankruptcy system retains the constitutional window dress-
ing of the 1984 Amendments without the predictability of the statutory core/non-
core division.306 It remains to be seen how far the Code, bankruptcy rules and courts 
may go in extracting consent from litigants, but Wellness may be read to sanction 
more coercion rather than less.307 Although it is perhaps unbecoming to suggest that 
district courts will be less than diligent in performing de novo review, it is nonethe-
less a risk, particularly because of courts’ reluctance to examine whether any given 
review truly affords litigants constitutional protections.308 The sky may not be falling 
on the bankruptcy system, but the hodgepodge of procedural mechanisms support-
ing it going forward hardly honor the “sacred” place of separation of powers under 
the Constitution, and they certainly do not serve as a model of administrative effi-
ciency. 
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